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ABSTRACT 
Many countries are pursuing innovation-led ‘smart’ growth, which requires long-run 
strategic investments and public policies that aim to create and shape markets, 
rather than just ‘fixing’ markets or systems. Market creation has characterized the 
kind of mission-oriented investments that led to putting a man on the moon and are 
currently galvanizing green innovation. Mission-oriented innovation has required 
public agencies to not only ‘de-risk’ the private sector, but also to lead the direct 
creation of new technological opportunities and market landscapes. This paper 
considers four key issues that arise from a market creating framework for policy: (1) 
decision-making on the direction of change; (2) the nature of (public and private) 
organizations that can welcome the underlying uncertainty and discovery process; (3) 
the evaluation of mission-oriented and market-creation policies; and (4) the ways in 
which both risks and rewards can be shared so that smart growth can also result in 
inclusive growth. 
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1. Societal Challenges and opportunity driven investments   
Innovation agencies around the world are increasingly considering socio-economic-
technological challenges that can be tackled through innovation policies (EC 
Innovation Union; OECD Innovation Strategy). The idea is that, through such 
challenges, which can relate to such issues as climate change, cancer, or the 
demographic-ageing crisis, innovation policy should produce solutions for societal 
problems. The present paper argues that such challenge-driven innovation policies 
require the traditional market failure justification for policy intervention, and even the 
system failure one, to be complemented with a more active market creating framework. 
To this end, the paper draws on and advances an analysis of the role of public policy 
in the economy that can provide a more strategic and mission-oriented approach.  
Societal challenges require technological, behavioral, and systemic changes and have 
much to learn from those mission-oriented feats that led to putting humans on the 
moon and to the emergence of new general-purpose technologies ranging from the 
Internet to biotechnology and nanotechnology (Foray et al. 2012). It was only possible 
to achieve those missions when the public and private sectors worked together to 
create new technologies and sectors (Mowery et al. 2010; Ruttan 2006). Crucially, the 
public side of such partnerships was not limited to incentivizing, facilitating, or de-
risking the private sector. Rather, it required that (public) risks be taken through 
choosing a particular direction of change (Mazzucato 2013a). Such directionality did 
not occur from the top down, but through a decentralized group of public agencies, 
what Block and Keller (2011) refer to as a “developmental network state”. Given the 
immense risks involved in choosing to develop particular sectors (such as 
nanotechnology), technologies (such as GPS), and broadly defined areas (such as the 
green economy), the relevant public institutions had to welcome the underlying 
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uncertainty that such choices entail. Some options win (such as the Internet) while 
others fail (such as the commercialization of the Concorde airplane). Indeed, the 
success of innovative public organizations like DARPA in the US Department of 
Defense, which has been responsible for the financing of Arpanet (the seed of the 
Internet), has been attributed to the attention it paid to internal organizational 
dynamics, which nurtured experimentation and learning (Abbate 1999; Block 2008), 
and ‘policy as process’ (Hirschman 1967; Rodrik 2014).  
Missions imply setting directions of change—that is, tilting (rather than leveling) the 
playing field to favor certain types of change more than others (Mazzucato and Perez 
2015). The IT revolution was picked as was also the biotech and nanotech revolution 
(Block and Keller 2011). What should be the core of the policy debate is not whether 
policies require picking and choosing but how to enable such picking to occur in the 
smartest way possible, nurturing a learning and adaptation process which prevents the 
system from getting locked into sub-optimal circumstances. Missions should be broad 
enough to catalyze many different sectors (the man on moon mission required a dozen 
sectors to engage) but concrete enough to translate into specific problems to solve, so 
that progress towards the mission can be evaluated on a continual basis.    
Thus limiting our understanding of the role of the public sector to one that simply 
‘administers’, ‘fixes’, ‘regulates’, and at best ‘facilitates’ and ‘de-risks’ the private sector, 
prevents us from thinking creatively about how to allow public sector vision, risk-taking, 
and investment to lead and structure the necessary transformational changes. A 
general lack of faith in the power of public institutions, driven by public choice theory 
(Buchanan 2003), has led to a reduction in the kinds of investments that the public 
sector makes in building its own capabilities and competencies (with a consequent rise 
in outsourcing, Crouch 2016), which are essential to guide such change.    
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The biased view of the public sector as at best facilitating change, rather than directly 
creating it, has been symptomatic of not only the market failure approach to policy 
intervention (discussed further below), but also of the evolutionary approach that has 
emphasized the role of public policy in terms of fixing system failures (Lundvall 1992). 
This is because the systems of innovation perspective has focused primarily on the 
need to build horizontal linkages between actors, rather than on direct (vertical) 
investments, and while this has contributed important insights into the framework 
conditions required for innovation, it has ignored those more vertical policies required 
for setting the direction of change, and the characteristics of public agencies required 
to set such a direction. In other words, by viewing public sector action (regulation or 
investment) as the solution to a problem that arises from different types of failures, 
whether these be coordination failures or network failures, it has indirectly perpetuated 
the view of the public sector as a passive force that can only facilitate change, rather 
than lead it. Consequently, the systems perspective to policy has provided little 
guidance for the directionality that is required in a world in which different pathways of 
development can be chosen even within a sector (Stirling 2014), and minimal insights 
are provided regarding the nature of the actors required. Is a financialized private 
sector the same as a non-financialized one? Are public organizations that aim to create 
horizontal conditions for innovation organized in the same way as those directed at 
missions that require picking of specific firms to support, particular technologies to 
develop, and broadly defined sectors to create?    
The key problem is that any framework that focuses on policy only in terms of fixing 
problems, especially (but not only) market failures, does not embody any explicit 
justification for the kind of market creation and mission-oriented directionality (and 
‘routes’ within directions) that was required for innovations such as the Internet and 
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nanotechnology and is required today to address societal challenges (Mazzucato 
2015). Secondly, by not considering the state as a lead investor and market creator, 
such failure-based approaches do not provide insights into the type and structure of 
public sector organizations that are needed in order to provide the depth and breadth 
of high-risk investments. Thirdly, as long as policy is seen only as an ‘intervention’, 
rather than a key part of the market creation and shaping process, the type of 
evaluation criteria used to assess mission-oriented investments will inevitably be 
problematic. Fourthly, by not describing the state as a lead risk-taker and investor in 
this process, the failure-based approaches have avoided a key issue regarding the 
distribution of risks and rewards between the state and the private sector.  
The present paper addresses these four challenges by asking the following questions: 
(1) How can public policy be understood in terms of setting the direction and route of 
change; that is, shaping and creating markets rather than just fixing them 
(Directionality)? 
(2) How can this alternative conceptualization be translated into new indicators and 
evaluation tools for public policies, beyond the micro-economic cost/benefit 
analysis and macro-economic appraisal of crowding in/crowding out that stem 
directly from the market failure perspective (Evaluation)? 
(3) How should public organizations be structured so they accommodate the risk-
taking, explorative capacity and capabilities needed to envision and manage 
contemporary challenges (Organizations)? 
(4) How can public investments along the innovation chain result not only in the 
socialization of risks, but also of rewards, enabling smart growth to also be inclusive 
growth (Risks and rewards)?  
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While the questions may seem broad, it is their potential connection that can help build 
a market creation framework. Policies that aim to actively create and shape markets 
require indicators that assess and measure the performance of a policy along that 
particular transformational objective. The state’s ability and willingness to take risks, 
embodied in transformational changes, requires an organizational culture (and policy 
capacity) that welcomes the possibility of failure and experimentation and is rewarded 
for successes so that failures (which are learning opportunities) can be covered and 
the next round financed.   
This alternative view (policy framework) of policy making builds on the inspirational 
work of Karl Polanyi (2001 [1944]), an economic historian and sociologist who 
understood markets as being deeply embedded in social institutions, and policy as not 
standing on the side-lines, but within the very market creation process. In his epic book 
The Great Transformation, Polanyi described the way in which capitalist markets are 
deeply embedded in social and political institutions, rendering the usual static state vs. 
market juxtaposition meaningless. As Polanyi wrote: “[t]he road to the free market was 
opened and kept open by an enormous increase in continuous, centrally organized 
and controlled interventionism” (2001 [1944], 144). Polanyi’s work has been 
revolutionary in terms of showing the myth of the state vs. market distinction: the most 
capitalist of all markets, the national market, was forcefully pushed into existence by 
the state. The market is embedded in and shaped by the state (Evans 1995). The 
present paper argues, in essence, that the four above questions can help govern the 
dynamics of embeddedness, so that policy choices are rendered more explicit (and 
hence also more easily debated), and the results of public policies can be measured 
with metrics that are adequate for a dynamic process.  
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the limits 
of market failure theory (MFT) in describing transformational change. Section 3 
considers ways in which recent advances in heterodox economics contain the seeds 
of an alternative framework to MFT. Section 4 considers the four key questions that 
emerge from considering a market shaping framework. Section 5 considers the new 
research questions that emerge from considering this perspective.   
 
2. Market failure theory 
Market failure theory justifies public intervention in the economy only if it is geared 
towards fixing situations in which markets fail to efficiently allocate resources (Arrow 
1951; Samuelson 1954). The market failure approach suggests that governments 
intervene to fix markets by investing in areas characterized by positive or negative 
externalities. For example, positive externalities arising from public goods (which are 
non-rivalrous and non-excludable) will be characterized by under-investment by the 
private sector and will therefore require public investment. This is the case for basic 
research, which has high spillovers that create difficulties in appropriating private 
returns; consequently, basic research is characterized by too little private investment. 
Negative externalities, such as those created by pollution, require public measures 
that cause the private sector to internalize external costs, such as through a carbon 
tax.    
 
A particular source of market failure comes from negative externalities that arise from 
the production or use of goods and services such as climate change, traffic 
congestion, or antibiotic resistance, for which there is no market. In this perspective, 
most societal challenges are seen as negative externalities. Such failures work at the 
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system level; that is, they amount to system failures. The socio-economic system as 
a whole results in costly outcomes that are undesirable from a societal point of view. 
For instance, climate change can be seen as a negative externality from carbon-
intensive production methods or the burning of fossil fuels. Indeed, the Stern Review 
(Stern 2006) on the economics of climate change stated that: “Climate change 
presents a unique challenge for economics: it is the greatest example of market failure 
we have ever seen” (Stern 2006, 1). Negative externalities are not reflected in the 
price system: there is no ‘equilibrium’ price because there is no market for negative 
externalities. Many economists have called for market-based mechanisms (such as 
carbon pricing or carbon taxes) or neutral technology policies (such as tax breaks) to 
correct for this type of market failure, both of which leave the market to determine the 
direction of change.   
 
While MFT provides interesting insights, it is at best useful for describing a steady-
state scenario in which public policy aims to put patches on existing trajectories 
provided by markets. It is less useful when policy is required to dynamically create and 
shape new markets; that is, ‘transformation’. This means it is problematic for 
addressing innovation and societal challenges because it cannot explain the kinds of 
transformative, catalytic, mission-oriented public investments (Foray et al. 2013) that 
created new technologies and sectors that did not previously exist. This includes the 
emergence of the Internet, the nanotechnology sector, the biotechnology sector, and 
the emerging clean-tech sector (Block and Keller 2012). Such mission-oriented 
investments coordinated public and private initiatives, built new networks, and drove 
the entire techno-economic process, which resulted in the creation of new markets 
(Mazzucato 2015). This depiction is very different from assuming that the private sector 
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is in a space and simply needs to be incentivized to invest more or less within that 
space.  It is the space itself that has been created by public policy, with the private 
sector entering only later. The imagination and vision emanated from the policy itself, 
which actively took risks rather than just de-risking.  
 
A key characteristic of market-creating investments is that they are not limited to 
upstream basic research (the classic public good). Indeed, public investments that led 
to technological revolutions (IT, biotech, nanotech) and new general-purpose 
technologies (such as the Internet) were distributed along the entire innovation chain: 
basic research through the National Science Foundation (NSF), applied research 
through DARPA and the National Institutes of Health (NIH), and early-stage financing 
of companies through agencies like Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) 
(Block and Keller 2011). This means that the kinds of innovation instruments 
(discussed by Martin 2016, this issue) were spread across a decentralized network of 
different agencies across the entire innovation chain. While such agencies might not 
act together in a planned way, the history of agencies like DARPA and NIH teaches us 
that they were often driven by a vision to create new landscapes (in defense or life-
sciences) rather than to only fix problems in existing landscapes. In order to 
understand such mission-oriented policies, and to guide future ones, it is essential to 
develop a framework that can take into account investments that direct/steer change 
in particular directions, with the public sector not only de-risking, but also taking risks 
and uncertainties as lead investor. A market-creating framework for policy, to 
complement the market (and system) fixing role, can build on several ‘heterodox’ 
economics literatures that have emphasized the state’s transformational capacity. We 
review these alternative literatures below.  
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3. Insights on market shaping/creating from alternative theories   
Policies based on building systems of innovation focus on the need for nations to build 
a “network of institutions in the public and private sectors whose activities and 
interactions initiate, import, modify and diffuse new technologies” (Freeman 1995). The 
emphasis here is not on the stock of R&D, but on the circulation of knowledge and its 
diffusion throughout the economy (Lundvall 1992). Institutional change is not assessed 
through criteria based on static allocative efficiency, but rather on how such change 
promotes technological and structural change. This perspective is neither macro nor 
micro, but more meso, where individual firms are seen as part of broader network of 
firms with which they cooperate and compete. The systems of innovation approach has 
been crucial for highlighting deficiencies in the market failure perspective, as it regards 
innovation policy (Lundvall 1992; Freeman 1995). It has emphasized the inability of 
MFT to tackle lock-in effects and to specific types of institutional failures that arise from 
feedback processes along the entire innovation chain (Verspagen 2006). As discussed 
by Brown (2016, this issue), key innovation institutions, such as universities, will only 
allow the innovation system to achieve its potential if they are lined up synergistically 
with other institutions in the entrepreneurial eco-system.  
However, while the systems of innovation approach has been key in identifying 
dynamic system failures, it has not explicitly created an alternative policy framework. 
This is because it has been too wed to the notion of policy as fixing, rather than 
wholeheartedly debunking the notion of policy as an ‘intervention’ in the market 
process. In order to develop an alternative framework, the market itself must be 
redefined as an outcome of the interactions between different agents, including public 
policy makers (Mazzucato 2013c).  
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In order to develop a market-creating view of policy, in the spirit of Karl Polanyi’s 
understanding of markets as outcomes embedded in policy processes, the paper 
draws on insights from different bodies of thought that have considered the role of the 
state in achieving transformation of the economic landscape. These are: (a) science 
and technology policy research on mission-oriented policies; (b) development 
economics research on the developmental state; (c) evolutionary economics research 
on shifts in technological trajectories and the emergence of techno-economic 
paradigms; and (d) my own research on the entrepreneurial state, which looks explicitly 
at the risk-taking role of different actors (Mazzucato 2013a). In section 4, I use these 
insights to consider new questions for economic policy that can help guide a market-
creating framework. The fact that these four bodies of thought have not previously 
been linked, and have not been clearly positioned to critique the key tenets of market 
failure theory, has prevented them from having the impact they could have on our 
understanding of how to guide, evaluate and manage public policy.  
a) Science and Technology Policy Research: Mission-Oriented Innovation 
Policy 
The history of innovation policy, studied especially through the systems of innovation 
approach (Freeman 1995), provides key insights into the limits of market failure theory 
with regard to justifying the depth and breadth of investments that have been 
necessary for the emergence of radical technological change. Innovation policy has 
historically taken the shape of measures that perform the following four functions: (1) 
support basic research, (2) aim to develop and diffuse general-purpose technologies, 
(3) develop certain economic sectors that are crucial for innovation, and (4) promote 
infrastructural development (Freeman and Soete 1997 [1974]). The justification of 
innovation policies has changed over time. While military motives predominated in the 
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1950s and 1960s, the aim since the 1970s has been to improve economic and 
competitive positions. In the 1980s, innovation policy became increasingly justified due 
to market failure. Innovation policies driven by military motives have been described 
as mission-oriented because they have aimed to achieve clearly defined technical 
goals. There have been calls in recent years for a return to such policies to address 
‘grand societal challenges’ (Mowery et al. 2010). However, Foray et al. (2012) 
contrasted missions of the past, such as putting a man on the moon, with such 
contemporary missions as tackling climate change. While past missions aimed to 
develop a particular technology (with the achievement of the technological objective 
signaling that the mission was accomplished), contemporary missions have addressed 
broader and more persistent challenges, which require long-term commitments to the 
development of technological solutions. The Maastricht Memorandum (Soete and 
Arundel 1993) provided a detailed analysis of the differences between old and new 
mission-oriented projects, showing that “older projects developed radically new 
technologies through government procurement projects that were largely isolated from 
the rest of the economy, though they frequently affected the structure of related 
industries and could lead to new spin-off technologies that had wide-spread effects on 
other sectors. In contrast, [contemporary] mission-oriented environmental [and other] 
projects will need to combine procurement with many other policies in order to have 
pervasive effects on the entire structure of production and consumption within an 
economy” (p. 50).  
However, research in this literature has often failed to integrate empirical insights in 
order to provide a fully-fledged theory that contrasts with MFT. Consequently, these 
studies have resulted in ad-hoc theoretical understandings and policy advice on how 
to manage mission-oriented initiatives, without tackling the key justifications for 
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mission-oriented investments in a way that contrasts the justifications that arise from 
MFT. In particular, the framework has been limited to looking at agencies that focus on 
science, technology, and innovation policies. Doing so ignores the relationship 
between types of finance and innovation development. It also overlooks, for example, 
the rise of public financial institutions like state investment banks (such as KfW in 
Germany or the China Development Bank) as sources of mission-oriented finance, 
especially as private finance has increasingly retreated from financing the real 
economy (Mazzucato 2013b; Mazzucato and Penna 2014). While mission-oriented 
programs are intrinsically dynamic, with feedback loops between missions and 
achievements, the tools used to evaluate such public policies have remained static, 
coming from the MFT toolbox. For these reasons, mission-oriented policy research is 
currently confined to a small area of policy research and practice and has had minimal 
impact on how economists understand the role of public policy.  
b) Development Economics: Developmental Network States 
Work on the developmental state, a concept from a small group of development 
economists, has revealed the importance of the ‘visible hand’ of the state in 
industrialization and technological change (Wade 1990; Amsden 2001). More recently, 
this literature has also emphasized the importance of a developmental network state; 
that is, a decentralized network of different types of state agencies that can foster 
innovation and development. While significant attention has been devoted to the role 
of large agencies or institutions (such as DARPA or the NIH) in historical mission-
oriented projects, it is only recently that considerable focus has been placed on the 
broader network of structures, actors, strategies and agencies, such as intelligence 
distributed amongst actors and institutions, flat organizational structures, flexibility, and 
customization (Perez 2002). Many successful cases of innovation and technology 
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policy strategies have been carried out by networks of decentralized public institutions, 
which have focused not on creating individual ‘national champion’ firms, but on 
establishing a constellation of innovative firms (O’Riain 2004). This has been the case 
in East Asia, Finland, Israel, Taiwan, and even in Silicon Valley in the United States 
(Block and Keller 2011). Such successful policies have covered a wide range of 
measures, including R&D support, training, support for marketing and exporting, 
funding programs (including early-stage venture capital), networking and brokerage 
services, building of facilities and clusters (so-called science parks), and fostering 
industrial ties.  
From this alternative view, economic development is not the result of natural 
competitive advantages, but of the endogenous creation of new opportunities that lead 
to the establishment of competitive advantages. This process requires discovery of the 
cost structure of an economy in order to identify which of the types of goods and 
services that already exist in world markets can be produced in a domestic economy 
at low cost (Rodrik 2004). The state plays a central coordinating role in this discovery 
process and often represents a lead agent in economic development efforts. Because 
economic development is an endogenous process, the state provides social capital, 
coordinates initiatives and public-private partnerships, fosters synergies, and promotes 
the introduction of new combinations that create Schumpeterian rents (Reinert 2007).   
c) Evolutionary Economics: Technological Trajectories and Techno-Economic 
Paradigm Shifts     
Following the Schumpeterian tradition, evolutionary economists aim to “open the black 
box of technical change” (Rosenberg 1982) with a methodology that is led by empirical 
regularities and historical analysis in order to understand the process that links 
technical change (innovation), economic growth, and development. Key concepts 
 14 
developed in evolutionary economics are those of technological paradigms and 
technological trajectories (Dosi 1982; Nelson and Winter 1982), which reveal the 
limitation of market forces in providing direction to economic development. A 
technological paradigm has a threefold definition: it is an outlook of the relevant 
productive problems confronted by firms (as producers of technologies or innovators); 
it represents a set of procedures (routines) of how these problems shall be 
approached; and it defines the relevant problems and associated knowledge 
necessary for their solution (Dosi 1982, 148). 
The evolutionary focus on the co-evolution of those processes creating variety 
between economic agents and the competitive selection process that winnows in on 
that variety, means that an evolutionary perspective on policy must consider 
adaptation (Witt 2003, and Flanagan and Uyarra 2016, this issue). Policies should 
not be viewed as general a priori answers, but as being about learning and 
emergence. Which policy is best in which environment will emerge from 
experimentation and trial and error. A technological trajectory, in turn, represents the 
direction of learning, experimentation, and progress within a technological paradigm. 
Therefore, technology development is a problem-solving activity, and a technological 
paradigm “embodies strong prescriptions on the directions of technical change” (Dosi 
1982, 152). This is why market signals are limited in terms of providing direction to 
techno-economic development; they only work within the parameters of the 
paradigm, which means they influence the rate of change more than the direction. 
When two or more technological paradigms compete, markets may influence which 
one is selected (the one that minimizes costs). Once established, however, 
paradigms have a powerful ‘exclusion effect’, whereby some technological 
possibilities are discarded because they are incompatible with the prevailing 
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paradigm and are therefore ‘invisible’ to agents. Thus, a techno-economic system of 
innovation may be locked into a self-reinforcing, path-dependent trajectory (Dosi and 
Nelson 1994). This becomes a problem if the trajectory being followed (or the 
paradigm itself) is inferior or suboptimal to what could be achieved with technologies 
that transgress the paradigm (or with a different paradigm). 
Perez (2002) expanded the notion of technological paradigm to techno-economic 
paradigm order to account for the non-technological forces (economic and social 
institutions) that characterize certain periods of capitalist history and affect both the 
economic and social systems. Her theory of techno-economic paradigm shifts is a 
historical perspective on the long-waves of development that accompany technological 
revolutions. “A techno-economic paradigm is, then, a best-practice model made up of 
a set of all-pervasive generic technological and organizational principles, which 
represent the most effective way of applying a particular technological revolution and 
of using it for modernizing and rejuvenating the whole of the economy” (Perez 2002, 
15). When a new technological revolution emerges, the socio-economic system 
remains stuck within the bounds of the previous paradigm. This renders market forces 
incapable of directing the system towards the new paradigm and stifles the 
modernizing and rejuvenating potential of the new revolution. In other words, there are 
mismatches between elements of the social and techno-economic systems (for 
example, social expectations, R&D routines, tax regimes, labor regulations). In order 
to overcome these mismatches, it is necessary to build new institutions that favor the 
diffusion of the new paradigm. In all previous technological revolutions, governments 
have led the process of institution-building that allowed new techno-economic 
paradigms to replace the old ones. Perez (2002) specifically pointed to the role that 
public policy plays in allowing the full deployment of technological revolutions, such as 
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the effect of suburbanization on the ability of the mass production revolution to diffuse 
throughout the economy.  
This stream of research on technological and techno-economic paradigms highlights 
the importance of cognition when establishing the direction of technological change. 
Paradigms are powerful enabling and constraining institutions that favor certain 
directions of techno-economic development and obstruct others. In order to redirect 
techno-economic development on a new, qualitatively different route, a paradigm shift 
is required that will avoid the constant renewal of prevailing trajectories that occurs if 
market forces provide directionality to the system. From this perspective, the state has 
a crucial role to play in terms of creating a new vision that will coordinate cognitive 
efforts of different (public and private) agents and direct their action to areas beyond 
the existing paradigm. Green innovation can be understood as a redirection of the full 
deployment of the IT revolution (Mazzucato and Perez 2014). In order to effectively 
provide the direction of change, a vision must be created and shared. Stirling (2008) 
correctly focused on the role of bottom-up participatory processes to ensure 
directionality is taken seriously and shared amongst actors.   
d)  The Entrepreneurial State: The State as Lead Risk-Taker and Investor in the 
Economy 
Alternative approaches to innovation policy, such as those described above, have 
questioned particular aspects of the economic dynamics embodied in Neoclassical 
theory. However, they have not questioned the underlying assumption of business 
being the only risk taker. The entrepreneurial state agenda has sought to challenge 
the notion of the entrepreneur being embodied in private business, and policy making 
being an activity outside of the entrepreneurial process (Mazzucato 2003). This 
perspective builds on studies in industry dynamics that have documented a weak 
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relationship between entry of new firms into industries and the current levels of profits 
in those industries (Vivarelli 2013). Firm entry appears to be driven by expectations 
about future growth opportunities, even when such expectations are overly optimistic 
(Dosi and Lovallo 1998). Historically, such technological and market opportunities have 
been actively shaped by government investment—what Mazzucato (2013a) refers to 
as the entrepreneurial state; that is, a willingness to invest in, and sometimes imagine 
from the beginning, new high-risk areas before the private sector does. Business has 
tended to enter new sectors only after the high risk and uncertainty has been absorbed 
by the public sector, especially in areas of high capital intensity. This has been the 
case with the IT revolution (Block and Keller 2011), the biotechnology industry 
(Lazonick and Tulum 2011), nanotechnology (Motoyama et al. 2011), and for the 
emerging clean tech sector (Mazzucato and Penna 2014). Indeed, Keller and Block 
(2013) have shown that private venture capital funds have focused on financing firms 
mid-stage, which had previously received early-stage financing by public programs, 
like the Small Business Innovation Research program (SBIR). The literature has 
ignored such private piggy-backing on public risk-taking, at best discussing it in terms 
of ‘crowding in’. What crowding in ignores, however, is the direct risk taking that such 
(public) activity entails, and hence the occasional failures that will inevitably result.  
In the book The Entrepreneurial State: Debunking Public vs. Private Sector Myths, 
Mazzucato (2013a) describes the risk-taking role the state has played in the few 
countries that have achieved innovation-led growth. Ignoring the high risk and 
uncertainty that the state has absorbed has caused the fruits of innovation-led growth 
to be privatized, even though the underlying risk was socialized. It is usually assumed 
that the returns to the state will occur indirectly through the spillovers that are 
generated and/or through tax revenue. However, this type of return is based on the 
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assumption that the state intervention is limited to upstream areas like basic research 
(with high spillovers). However, the traditional assumptions break down when the 
intervention occurs throughout the entire innovation chain, including for applied 
research for technologies that get appropriated by specific firms, and on early-stage 
high-risk company financing. This happens because the firms in question often 
succeed in avoiding tax, and also because there is no reason for the firms to remain in 
the region/country where the public funding originated. Thus the entrepreneurial state 
framework implies considering both indirect and direct ‘reward’ mechanisms for the 
public policies. Such mechanisms can make it easier for public organizations to treat 
their investments as portfolios, able to make some return on the upside to cover the 
downside as well as the next round of investments. More evidence is needed from 
around the world regarding the challenges and opportunities related to different types 
of return-generating mechanisms for public investments, such as those in Israel 
(through Yozma), the US (through In-Q-tel) and Finland (through SITRA). This will help 
generate insights into the role of the state as a spender, facilitator and regulator, but 
also as an investor and venture capitalist (Mazzucato 2013a; Rodrik 2015). How to do 
this, while retaining a mission-oriented perspective (not limited by cost–benefit 
analysis), is a key challenge. 
4. Beyond market failure: Routes, organization, assessment, and rewards 
New economic thinking is required in order to build a policy framework that can be 
oriented towards market creating, rather than just market fixing, and can be focused 
on transforming the economic landscape rather than just facilitating it. This section 
brings together key concepts from the four heterodox frameworks reviewed above, 
drawing especially on the empirical research conducted within these perspectives, in 
order to provide a new theoretical conceptualization for guiding state action to tackle 
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transformational change. The section considers four new policy questions, which can 
help build a market-creating policy agenda (Mazzucato 2015).  
Directionality: Understanding the role of policy as setting the direction of 
change. Policies that aim to correct markets assume that once the sources of the 
failure have been addressed, market forces will efficiently direct the economy to a path 
of growth and development. However, markets are “blind” (Dosi 1982) and the direction 
of change provided by markets often represents suboptimal outcomes from a societal 
point of view. This is why, in addressing societal challenges, states have led the 
process and provided the direction towards new techno-economic paradigms that did 
not emerge spontaneously out of market forces. Governments made direct 
investments in the technologies that enabled the mass production and IT revolutions 
to emerge, and formulated bold policies that allowed these phenomena to be fully 
deployed throughout the economy (Ruttan 2006; Block and Keller 2011). This fact 
seems to point to different analytical problems facing policy makers: namely, choosing 
whether the correct course of action is to direct or stand back; understanding how 
particular directions and routes can be picked; and determining how to mobilize and 
manage activities that can lead to the achievement of dynamic social and technological 
challenges.  
The problem is not whether to pick a direction, but how to learn from the successful 
picking of the past, and to enable the directions picked to be broad enough to allow 
bottom-up exploration, discovery and learning. This is sometimes referred to as “smart 
specialization” (Foray, David and Hall 2009) and is explicitly a results- and outcome-
oriented agenda, not an input- or outputs-oriented one (Rodrik 2004). However, the 
fact that it has hitherto been based on a market failure framework means that smart 
specialization is, at best, considered a ‘discovery’ process with which stakeholders and 
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policy-designers can jointly identify bottlenecks, market failures, and missing links. 
Smart specialization has not addressed the way in which innovation-led growth in 
places like Silicon Valley actually happened. Doing so requires not only the 
identification of missing links, but the formation of concrete strategies towards 
producing market landscapes that simply did not exist in the past. It also requires that 
the playing field be tilted in the direction pursued, rather than leveled (Mazzucato and 
Perez 2015).  
 
Organization: Transforming public organizations into ones that welcome 
learning, experimentation and self-discovery. If brought to its extreme, as 
advocated by critics from public choice theory, MFT calls for the state to intervene as 
little as possible in the economy, in a way that minimizes the risk of government failure, 
from crowding out to cronyism and corruption. This view requires a structure that 
insulates the public sector from the private sector (to avoid issues such as agency 
capture) and has resulted in a trend of outsourcing that often rids government of the 
knowledge capacities and capabilities (in relation to IT, for example) that are necessary 
for managing change (Kakabadse and Kakabadse 2002). Studies have examined the 
influence of outsourcing on the ability of public institutions to attract top-level talent with 
the relevant knowledge and skills to manage transformative mission-oriented policies. 
Without such talent and expertise it is nearly impossible for the state to fulfill its role of 
coordinating and providing direction to private actors when formulating and 
implementing policies that address societal challenges. In order to promote 
transformation of the economy, by shaping and creating technologies, sectors, and 
markets, the state must organize itself so that it has the intelligence (policy capacity) 
to think big and formulate bold policies. If the state is essential to the process of 
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transformative technological and socio-economic change, it is also essential to 
understand the appropriate structure of public organizations. Innovation is subject to 
extreme uncertainty, which creates the need for both patience (“patient long-term 
capital”, Mazzucato 2013b) and the ability to experiment and explore the underlying 
landscape (Rodrik 2004). Therefore, a crucial element in organizing the state for its 
market-creating role is building its absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal 1990), a 
concept that has hitherto been restricted to private organizations. This absorptive 
capacity will enable public agencies to learn in a process of investment, discovery, and 
experimentation, and see policy as process (Hirschman 1967).   
A key concern should be to establish skills/resources, capabilities, and structures that 
can increase the chances that a public organization will be effective, both at learning 
and at establishing symbiotic partnerships with the private sector, and ultimately 
succeed in implementing mission-oriented and transformative policies. Public and 
private organizations must re-rethink their roles when working together. Public–private 
partnerships have often limited the public part in de-risking the private part. This 
ignores the capabilities and challenges involved in public sector risk taking. De-risking 
assumes a conservative strategy that minimizes the risks of picking losing projects, but 
does not necessarily maximize the probability of picking winners, which requires the 
adoption of a portfolio approach for public investments (Rodrik 2013). In such an 
approach, the success of a few projects can cover the losses from many projects, and 
the public organization in question also learns from its loss-making investments 
(Mazzucato 2013a). Here, the matching between failures and fixes is less important 
than having an institutional structure that ensures that winning policies provide enough 
rewards to cover the losses, and that losses are used as lessons to improve and renew 
future policies. Research on the developmental state (Block and Keller 2011) suggests 
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that these goals are best achieved not through top-down policies, but through a 
decentralized structure in which the organization(s) involved remain nimble, 
innovative, and dynamic from within. This strand of thinking can benefit from looking 
at the ways in which public–private partnerships were created when seeking the joint 
creation of new products and services, including vaccines (Chataway et al. 2007). 
Evaluation: Transforming static metrics into dynamic ones. The market failure 
framework has developed concrete indicators and methods to evaluate government 
investments, which stem directly from the framework itself, usually through a cost–
benefit analysis that estimates whether the benefits of public intervention compensate 
for the costs associated with the market failure and with the implementation of the 
policy (including governmental failures). The problem is that there is a mismatch 
between the intrinsically dynamic character of economic development and the static 
tools used to evaluate the role of the public policy in the process.  
Failure to allow for the possibility that government can transform and create new 
landscapes that did not previously exist will affect the ability to measure such impact. 
This is evident in innovation and also for public services (Crouch 2015). This situation 
then leads to accusations of government crowding out business, which implies that 
the areas that government moves into could have been areas for business 
investment. Such claims are best defended through a crowding in argument, which 
relies on showing how government investments create a larger national output pie 
(hence higher savings for private investment to dip into). Indeed, as shown by Engel, 
Rothgang and Eckl (2016, this issue), public investments in R&D often crowd in 
further R&D investments by business.  
However, this defense does not account for the fact that businesses are risk-averse 
and unwilling or unable to transform existing and create new landscapes, which is 
 23 
about creating new pies, not increasing existing ones. Without indicators for such 
transformative action, the static toolbox affects the government’s ability to determine 
whether it is simply operating in existing spaces or making new things happen that 
would not have happened anyway (its ‘additionality’). This often leads to investments 
that are overly narrow or directed within the confines of the boundaries set by the 
business practices of the prevailing techno-economic paradigm (Abraham 2010).  
Therefore, it is crucial to develop a new toolbox and indicators for evaluating and 
measuring the degree to which state investments open up and transform sectoral and 
technological landscapes, rather than tinkering with existing ones. The indicators must 
take into account the underlying risk and uncertainty absorbed in transforming such 
landscapes.   
 
Risks and Rewards: building symbiotic private–public partnerships. MFT says 
little about cases in which the state is the lead investor and risk taker in capitalist 
economies. Having a vision about the direction in which to drive an economy requires 
direct and indirect investment in particular areas, not just creating the (framework) 
conditions for change. Crucial choices must be made, the fruits of which will create 
some winners, but also many losers. For example, the US Department of Energy 
recently provided guaranteed loans to two green-tech companies: Solyndra ($500 
million) and Tesla Motors ($465 million). While the latter is often glorified as a success 
story, the former failed miserably and became the latest example in the media of 
government being inefficient and unable to pick winners (Wood 2012). However, any 
venture capitalist will admit that for every winning investment (such as Tesla) there are 
many losses (such as Solyndra). In making its downstream investments, therefore, 
governments can learn from portfolio strategies of venture capitalists, structuring 
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investments across a risk space so that lower risk investments can help to cover the 
higher risk ones. In other words, if the public sector is expected to compensate for the 
lack of private venture capital (VC) money going to early-stage innovation, it should at 
least be able to benefit from the wins, as private VC does. Otherwise, the funding for 
such investments cannot be secured. As argued in Mazzucato and Wray (2015), even 
if money could be secured for public investments endogenously (through money 
creation), it is desirable to allow the state to reap some of the rewards from its 
investments for a number of other reasons. Matching this type of spending with the 
corresponding return would provide a measure of efficiency, holding policymakers 
accountable; government net spending has limits dictated by the real resource capacity 
of the economy; and voters will be more willing to accept the (inevitable) failures if they 
see that those are compensated by important successes. 
The public sector can use a number of return-generating mechanisms for its 
investments, including retaining equity or royalties, retaining a golden share of the IPR, 
using income-contingent loans, or capping the prices (which the tax payer pays) of 
those products that emanate, as drugs do, from public funds (Mazzucato 2013). Before 
exploring the details of each mechanism, however, it is crucial for the policy framework 
to even allow the question to be asked. In a market-shaping framework, does 
government have the right to retain equity more than in a market failure framework? 
Are taxes currently bringing back enough return to government budgets to fund high-
risk investments that will probably fail?   
5. Conclusion  
This paper has considered the limitations of the market failure framework that 
continues to guide innovation policy. It has argued that putting innovation at the center 
of growth policy requires an emphasis on shaping and creating markets rather than 
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just fixing them and that an alternative framework must also go beyond fixing system 
failures. To guide a market-creating view, the paper has considered insights from 
alternative (heterodox) literatures on the role of the state in producing structural change 
and transformation. Four critical issues must be considered when building such a 
framework: (1) the direction of change promoted by policy; (2) the nature of (public and 
private) organizations that can welcome the underlying uncertainty and discovery 
process; (3) the evaluation of mission-oriented and market-creation policies; and (4) 
the ways in which both risks and rewards can be shared so that smart growth can also 
result in inclusive growth.  
Considering the need for government policy to transform, be catalytic, and create and 
shape markets rather just fix them helps reframe the key questions of economic policy 
from static ones that deal with crowding out and picking winners to more dynamic ones 
that help form the types of public–private interactions that can create new innovation 
and industrial landscapes. The point is not to prescribe specific technologies, but to 
provide directions of change around which bottom-up solutions can then experiment. 
As Stirling (2014, 2) put it: “The more demanding the innovation challenges like 
poverty, ill health or environmental damage, the greater becomes the importance of 
effective policy. This is not a question of ‘picking winners’—an uncertainty-shrouded 
dilemma which is anyhow equally shared between public, private and third sectors. 
Instead, it is about engaging widely across society, in order to build the most fruitful 
conditions for deciding what ‘winning’ even means”. While identifying key societal 
challenges is straightforward—climate change, ageing, resource security, housing, 
urbanization, etc.—translating challenges into concrete missions will require the 
involvement of an array of stakeholders concerned with sectors and socio-technical 
fields affected by the challenge itself. Therefore, defining the direction of investments 
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should be based on sound diagnosis of each challenge by the state together with other 
stakeholders.  
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